1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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4	IN RE: VIOXX
5	DOCKET NO. MDL 05-1657 "L" NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA WEDNESDAY APRIL 19, 2006, 9:00 A.M.
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8	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELDON E. FALLON
9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10	
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O'MELVENY & MYERS BY: JOHN BEISNER, ESQUIRE 1625 EYE STREET WASHINGTON DC 20006 FOR THE LOUISIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL DUGAN & BROWNE BY: JAMES R. DUGAN, ESQUIRE 650 POYDRAS STREET, SUITE 2150 AND BLUE CROSS OF NEW ORLEANS LA 70130 LOUISIANA: OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: CATHY PEPPER, CCR, RPR, CRR 500 POYDRAS STREET, ROOM B406 NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70130 (504) 589-7779 PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY. TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED BY COMPUTER. 

## P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 2006

## MORNING SESSION

(COURT CALLED TO ORDER)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Everyone rise.

THE COURT: Be seated, please. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I apologize it's so cold, but I assume that after we finish the argument we'll be heated up.

Call the case, please.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Civil Action MDL 1657 In re: Vioxx.

THE COURT: Counsel make their appearance for the record, please.

MR. HERMAN: Good morning, Judge Fallon. Russ Herman for the Plaintiffs Steering Committee with regard to the privilege issues, and with me at counsel table is Anthony Irpino.

MR. WITTMANN: Good morning, Your Honor. Phil Wittmann for Merck, and with me is John Beisner, who will be arguing the motion this morning.

THE COURT: We have two motions, actually. The first motion has to do with consolidation, and the second motion has to do with the privilege issues. So let me deal with the first motion first, the issue of consolidation.

This matter involves the plaintiffs seek to consolidate two separate claims. The Louisiana Attorney General, on behalf of Medicare, has filed a claim seeking reimbursement for the cost

of Vioxx as well as the damages resulting from the use of Vioxx. The plaintiffs, Blue Cross have about the same type claim. Some issues are different, but they also seek return of monies for the purchase of Vioxx and also for the damages they allegedly claim, the medical damages, the medical costs they allegedly claim resulting from taking Vioxx. At issue here today is the consolidation of these two claims.

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MR. DUGAN: That's correct, Your Honor. Good morning,

James Dugan on behalf of the Louisiana Attorney General and

Blue Cross of Louisiana, and Your Honor is absolutely correct. I

know you know the gist of the claims and what these cases are

about. And as you know, the Court enjoys broad discretion in

consolidation of the cases.

Brief procedural history as you know, the Louisiana

Attorney General case was filed in CDC and removed to Your Honor.

The Blue Cross case was originally filed as a class action,

original filing in the Eastern District of Louisiana.

We filed a motion to consolidate. The defendant had several arguments. The first argument was that you couldn't consolidate a class action and an individual case. The second argument was that even if you would consolidate it, that it would be too confusing for a jury. And then the last argument was that, further again, even if you would consolidate it, that somehow that you would have to try individual mini trials to be able to determine what beneficiaries were injured by Vioxx.

THE COURT: Wouldn't you also have to determine who said what to whom and whom knew what and who should have known what?

Isn't that part of the whole process?

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MR. DUGAN: Yes, sir. It is, Judge. And that is very easily -- that is very easily addressed. I represent the Attorney General in several pharmaceutical cases, and I represented Blue Cross in several other pharmaceutical cases.

Discovery, first of all, on the first issue of who said what to whom, the defendants can take the 30(b)(6)'s of representatives from DHH at the Louisiana Attorney General's office. This data is readily available.

Basically the discovery is the same. You take 30(b)(6) from the Louisiana Attorney General, DHH, you take the 30(b)(6) of the Blue Cross representative who handles these claims.

THE COURT: But aren't you seeking individual damages, and if you're seeking individual damages, doesn't each claimant have some knowledge or some participation in that?

MR. DUGAN: Yes, Judge, but it very easily resolved, which is the sales representatives. The Merck sales representatives, I know there is only one that went to Blue Cross, and I'm almost positive that there was only one or two that actually went to the State. So we can find out that information from them.

They can take the 30(b)(6)'s of the plaintiffs to find out what they knew and what information Merck was supposed to

give to them. They can also ask questions about, you know, did they rely upon these representations in including these drugs on the formulary. It's no more than a couple of depositions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I've got the gist of it. Let me hear from the defendant. I'll give you an opportunity to rebut.

MR. BEISNER: Good morning, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: How do you see the problem in trying such a case?

MR. BEISNER: Well, Your Honor, I think the main point here is that to the extent that counsel is talking about consolidation for discovery purposes and so on, that's already achieved. We're all here before the same court. We can do discovery at the same time.

It's really the trial issue that Your Honor is focusing on here. And frankly, I think it's entirely premature to make this determination now. We need a record here to figure out how complicated that trial is going to be.

Counsel is talking about how easy it will be to get the discovery on this. I think he's wrong about that. I think it's going to be far more complex to get the discovery on this, but the real question is when you get that discovery, what is this case going to look like in terms of presentation to the jury?

And you're going to have one fact pattern, a set of fact patterns with respect to Blue Cross/Blue Shield, an entirely

different set of facts which would be very complex in and of themselves with respect to the Attorney General.

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I think as Your Honor pointed out, these claims are really many individual product liability cases, because part of the case on both sides involves prescription of the drug to individual claimants, what went into that process, and whether or not there is any causation with respect to those individual cases. I don't know how we go about doing that if you keep them separate, but you put them together, and you greatly magnify the problem.

And what the law says we need here is really to have a record to determine whether or not that trial can be conducted fairly from the defendant's standpoint, and we really just don't have that record. We have a couple of pages from plaintiffs making the representations about this, but the bottom line is the plaintiffs claims are highly individualized.

From everything we know right now, a consolidated trial can result in substantial bias. A joint trial would allow plaintiffs to put before the jury evidence regarding one case that would be irrelevant in the other case and, therefore, can create bias, and there is a likelihood, as a result, of jury confusion.

You add to that the idea that you're combining a private and public trial. You've got the AG present in one of the cases, which is going to suggest to the jury that somehow the

AG, an elected figure in the state, is endorsing the claim of Blue Cross/Blue Shield.

These claims are very complex trials in and of themselves and mixing them, Your Honor, we think would create substantial jury confusion and substantial bias to Merck, but we need the full record to make that determination.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks very much. I really have read this, and I do understands the issues, folks. I agree with the defendant. I don't want to say that it's never going to be consolidated, but I don't see the advantage of consolidating at this time. I do see an advantage of consolidating the discovery but you've already got that.

For me at this point to say we're going to consolidate all of these claims is a little, at best, premature, and it's hard for me at this time, and maybe forever, to see how I can have a large group, two large groups of claims that involve individuals for whom you're seeking individual damages for each one of those claimants to deal with this issue.

I can see, and some of the state courts have done it successfully, combining a number of cases. I don't know whether the number is two or three or five or whatever. I can see doing that later on down the road, perhaps, but to combine hundreds of them and thousands of them and say that's what we ought to do, and have one jury sit on that, it just --

MR. DUGAN: Judge, can I comment on that?

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. DUGAN: My comment on that is, you're right, there are two components of the claims, as we sit here today. The prescription reimbursement claim, which is simple. We ran the numbers with the state. They have about 15 million out prescription costs. Blue Cross of Louisiana has about 10 million out of prescription costs.

It's taking us a long time to get in front of

Your Honor. I have -- and I have consulted with my clients, and
we would be willing to waive, though, the medical reimbursement
claim in exchange for getting a trial date. This is something
that's been a work in progress, and both of these clients are
substantial entities, which you have to go through the proper
channels of getting authority to do so.

So I'm trying to make this as simple as possible, so if the Court has a real issue with that, and I understand that, I'm prepared to amend or file a Motion to Dismiss those particular claims to centralize it to just the prescription reimbursement case.

THE COURT: What's the situation with Blue Cross? Do they waive the same thing?

MR. DUGAN: They would waive the same thing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's potentially doable. I can see something like that better than I can see the individual claimants. I don't know how we deal with individual claimants

when you take the position that they have individual claims.

That's what this whole case is about. And how would I just consolidate your cases and not try all of the other cases at one time? For one hundred thousand of them.

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MR. DUGAN: I understand completely, and the direct claims, the direct claims for the prescription reimbursement, I would agree, would be a lot cleaner.

THE COURT: Help me think this through. What's this situation with New Jersey now? They have a nationwide class action. Does that play any part in your thinking?

MR. DUGAN: Yes, sir. They have a nationwide class action, as you know. The class certification was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in New Jersey.

Two points on that: Number 1, Blue Cross of
Louisiana's claim is so substantial, in the millions of dollars,
that it's going to be a separate case. So I think the I think
the law has bolstered the claims tremendously, and the inquiries
that the Court has done on the factual side of it on the
certification phase, that it helps liability wise.

As far as Blue Cross is you concerned, they would opt out of any national settlement over there. In front of Your Honor is the master purchase claims complaint which Blue Cross decided, because its claim was so substantial, that they are not a class representative in that case.

Secondly, that class definition in New Jersey excludes

governmental entities. So the Attorney General would not be a part of that.

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Also the caveat, Judge, as you may or may not be aware, the Texas Attorney General also filed suit. They got removed in federal court, but they got remanded back down to Travis County, Texas. They have a trial date set in January of '06 -- I'm sorry, of '07. January of '07, under the Texas Medicaid statute, clearly allows the State of Texas to go after prescription reimbursement claims.

So that case is going to be tried. These cases can absolutely be tried. If you don't want -- I think consolidation would be a lot cleaner, if we narrow it down to just the prescription reimbursement.

Another difference between the AG case and the Blue Cross case is that when the AG case got removed, Merck answered it completely. No motions to dismiss and they answered the whole thing; whereas, the Blue Cross case, they answered part of it, but they also filed Motion to Dismiss on part of it.

So I'm here on behalf of both clients. My position is that, Number 1, I will be filing a Motion to Amend or a Motion to Dismiss the medical reimbursement claims, and also, I guess, I don't know whether I need to reurge the Motion to Consolidate in light of that.

THE COURT: Yes, I think you should. And I want you to think about it, because I don't know what position I'm going to

take on it. I hadn't focused and I want to give counsel an opportunity to at least speak on that issue when you file your motion, so I don't want you to feel that it's just going to be routine. I want to hear you, and I want to hear counsel.

I do say that it makes it easier to consider consolidation than it does when you put everything else in the picture.

MR. DUGAN: And then, in addition, Your Honor, if the term consolidation is inappropriate, the Louisiana Attorney General case is ready to go, and we would be willing to try that case in December or January or the first trial date that you have.

THE COURT: What about the situation with the injunction? How do you see that? You're asking for an injunction; Blue Cross is not. How does that play with the jury? Do I have a judge and jury case or a judge case, a jury case, or just a jury case?

MR. DUGAN: Well, also in the amendment, Judge, I took out the claim for the jury claim, so my position is I would try it to Your Honor.

THE COURT: I will give that some thought too when we visit next time.

I'll hear from you.

MR. BEISNER: Just one clarification. I don't want to argue this now because I understand there will be a new motion on

this, but I just wanted to clarify my one thing just so it's clear on the record here.

We're talking about two different sets of cases. We've got AG cases, and the one point I wanted to make is that the Court has before it now AG cases from Louisiana, as represented here, and Mississippi, which has been transferred here.

The Alaska Attorney General has filed an action as well, which the federal district court in Alaska has stayed to permit transfer here, so that case is headed here.

The Texas case has been removed again to federal court after the discovery indicated the existence of a plethora of federal issues. And we're asking that that case be moved here as well, and there is also a case pending in Montana, so there will be a cluster of state AG cases here.

Then we also have a collection of other third-party payor cases here. So there is a little bit of an issue of prematurity there because what you're doing is taking one from each, putting them together, sort of without respect to the fact that you've got other cases in those categories, so that's another issue on prematurity, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What do you think about judge rather than jury? Have you-all given that some thought?

MR. BEISNER: Your Honor, we have not looked at that.

THE COURT: What about the situation if there is a claim for, and I understand the injunction claim, I'm not quite sure I

understand whether that's the extent or not, but if there is an injunction for the request from the Attorney General, which is generally a judge matter, as opposed to the Blue Cross, which is generally a jury matter, how do you mix that?

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MR. BEISNER: I'm not sure we've thought that through fully, Your Honor. We want to address that in the briefing. We think that could actually add to some of the confusion because I think that some of the claims may still be jury claims, but I guess it's how they replead there as well.

And the facts are actually quite different, Your Honor, on the representational issues as well because on the AG side you get into the federal Medicare regulations as to the process the state had to go through and the deference it had to pay to the FDA approval of the drug in deciding to include it as part of his formulary program, which isn't true in the private case side, so those cases probably will try quite differently, but again, we need further factual element to make that determination.

THE COURT: Just for the record then I'll deny the Motion to Consolidate presently because I see the two aspects of the claims, both the recoupment of costs of medicine as well as the recoupment of costs of medical care made necessary allegedly by the use of Vioxx, particularly the latter aspect of the claim is so specific -- who knew what, when they knew it, what they should have known, or what they did about it -- causation issues are so diverse, so different that it would seem to me not to be

helpful to consolidate those matters.

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But we'll talk a little bit more about the issue. I'm going to deny the motion now but allow the parties to amend and bring it back to me in a different state. Thank you very much.

Now we have a motion with regard to privileged documents. The plaintiffs in this matter some time ago have sought documents from the defendant. The defendants have given a substantial number of documents but also have claimed the attorney-client privilege on a vast number of documents, some 81 boxes. And we're here today to talk about reconsideration of the Court's position on these documents.

I should say that when I originally got those boxes — let me back up and say that there was a controversy as to whether the documents should be forthcoming. The parties tried to negotiate it. The parties tried to get a privileged log that was drawn with more specificity than it had been. The defendants resisted. Eventually another privileged log was drafted, but even that, the plaintiffs said, was not specific enough.

And I looked at the situation and required that the documents been given to the Court in camera, put in the registry of the court. Some 81 boxes of documents were delivered to the Court. Five thousand, six thousand documents per box, nearly 500,000 documents.

What I first thought was doable was for the documents to be categorized into various categories and a representative

portion of each category be selected and looked at by the Court and then a decision made on that particular category.

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I instructed the defendants to give me a privileged log with the categories fleshed out. I got a privileged log, but the privileged log was over a thousand pages. Frankly, it wasn't helpful to me, and I realized that it was not doable to categorize them because they were strewn throughout the boxes, so the categories, even if I were able to isolate the documents, it would be a Herculean task to simply find those various documents, extract them, put them in different boxes, and then proceed with my review.

So what I decided to do was to review each of the documents. So for the last two weeks, coming early and working late, I've looked through 500,000 pages and made my decision on the documents. I excluded certain documents from the boxes and declared that those were excluded documents. They were still privileged. The other documents, I felt, were not privileged.

When I finished the first 20 or 30 boxes, I put out a minute entry advising the parties that I had reviewed those documents. I then made the documents that I maintained the privilege on available to the defendant.

The defendant looked at these documents and took issue with my rulings, saying that I should have made, should have declared other documents privileged in addition to those that I had declared privileged. And therefore, now they reurge their

motion and ask the Court to reconsider its position, so we're here today to talk about that.

Let me hear from the parties, either one of them.

MR. BEISNER: Since it's our motion, Your Honor, I guess I will start.

THE COURT: That's fine.

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MR. BEISNER: Let me start, Your Honor, by saying that we are quite grateful for the enormous amount of time that I know you've dedicated, personally dedicated to reviewing the documents in dealing with this issue and regret the amount of time.

THE COURT: I'm probably the only one in this room who has looked over every one of those 500,000 pages.

MR. BEISNER: I will confirm, as far as I'm concerned, that you are absolutely correct, Your Honor. All I can say, Your Honor, is that the volume of those documents is at least in part a product of the number of documents that we have been asked to produce to date.

Just for the record, I note that Merck has produced close to 2.4 million documents in a litigation that's about 18 million pages of materials. And of those, and I'm talking here about documents as opposed to pages, which I know is substantially larger, I think we've claimed privilege for about 24,200 that have been withheld in their entirety. There are some others as to which we have redaction, so that's about one percent of the total production.

I guess the issue here is more were they properly withheld from a privileged standpoint, but I think just in terms of percentages, that one percent is fairly consistent with what you see in most proceedings, but again numbers aren't the issue here. The question is whether the documents themselves are privileged.

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Your Honor, I guess just one observation that I make at the outset here, and I suspect that the Court is quite familiar with this, but you do have a problem, a thorny issue of privilege reviews in cases because of concern about consistency. I am sure that when Your Honor went through the documents, there were a fair number as to which you said, I don't know why we're arguing about this. This is a completely neutral document or is actually favorable to the defendant.

The problem, though, is one of consistency because if some documents are released, our very worthy adversaries will say that's a precedence for releasing other categories of documents.

THE COURT: Frankly the other problem in this situation is always the logistics, too. From anybody's standpoint when they are looking through documents, it's generally done with a team, numbers of people, and it generally extends over a period of time, and consistency is lax at best. It's often in the eye of the beholder, and it depends upon the person's view of the litigation, and knowledge of the litigation, and overview of the litigation. They tend to err on the side of the person that's

declaring the privilege, and so if it looks like an interesting document, they declare it privileged. They don't go any further than that, and that's the problem as a practical matter that the Court always confronts.

MR. BEISNER: Your Honor, given those consistency issues that you're pointing to and the fact that privileged designations can often be close calls, it's not surprising that court's designations will come out differently with respect to a number of cases.

Out concern here is not wanting to throw out the baby with the bath water here. There are a number of documents as to which the company believes its cause would be considered more meritorious if we were able to give the Court more specific information on those individual documents.

We acknowledge this may have been a problem as far as we were concerned that the Court didn't find the privileged log useful. Of course, there is other information that probably needs to be conveyed in camera because that further explanation, of course, breaches the privilege, and that's sort of the gap that we're concerned about here is that -- and again, Your Honor, we take the responsibility on this ourselves, but we feel that some of these documents, there is probably a need to convey to the Court in camera some additional background information that might be informative with respect to those calls.

In our Motion for Reconsideration, we identified 25

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sample documents that we thought warranted the Court's further consideration with some additional information that we provided. Your Honor, I'm not sure it would be helpful to go through those here. You have that information.

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THE COURT: No, I have it. And frankly, I got that material as I was going into the 31st box. So I took that into consideration and took your observations into consideration, and then when I finished the 81st box, I went back, frankly, and looked a second time at the first 30 boxes. It's like reading War and Peace over 81 times, Tolstoy's tome, so I understand this situation fairly well.

MR. BEISNER: Well, Your Honor, I won't belabor that. I guess really what we were asking was for some opportunity, and again, Your Honor, we do not want to ask the Court to go through this process again. That is not at all what we're here for. We not seen the totality of the Court's calls on this, either the re-review of the first 30 boxes or the latter, but we were simply looking for some opportunity with respect to --

THE COURT: You see, the problem is that you had some opportunity, and that's the part that a privileged log plays, frankly. I know that in a privileged log, you don't want to tell the entire scope of the document because then it defeats the purpose, but it would be helpful if your privileged log would say, Document 1006 is a letter from an attorney to a client regarding a patent. It doesn't have to say what the patent is.

It doesn't have to say what the situation is, so you reserve that, but it's meaningful to me.

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But just to say, An e-mail, I don't know who is the lawyer. I don't know whether there is a lawyer in that e-mail. I know that there are some lawyers because I've gotten their names, but I deduced that. You didn't help me with that. The only one that was obvious to me was Joanne Lahner, because you asked her everything and often copied her. But there are some other lawyers that are in there that I didn't know were lawyers until I got into it and then started making lists that these are lawyers. But that's what I did. You didn't do it. If you had done it, it would have been easier.

I understand your position. Folks, I really have read your material, and I do understand it. Let me hear from the plaintiffs.

MR. HERMAN: First of all, Your Honor, good morning.

I'm Russ Herman for the PSC, and I can assure you Mr. Irpino and
I have not read a single document, but we're anxious to do it,
and we're willing to have a team that's already assembled go
through the 81 boxes so that the four cases Your Honor has set
for trial will have the benefit of those documents.

This issue is pregnant with delay, nine months of delay, and it's about time to deliver this child. I think at one point Merck must have gone to Broadway and 46th Street, studied the guy that plays the Three-Card Monte and watch the

Legerdemain, which is certainly faster and quicker than the eye in order to not only create 500,000 documents and label them privileged but to mix them up while they did it. That's not easy to shuffle all that stuff together.

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The Court made a thorough review. What context is needed? Your Honor sat through two trials, a hundred motions, a number meet and confers, more than nine months of conferences on this matter. Why now does the information come forward? Because everything the defendants raise now could have been raised in the privilege log.

I mean, they didn't list -- we asked on August 22nd, we said this is not a privilege log. This is not what the Fifth Circuit requires. On August 24th, we indicated in brief and in letter, You violated Rule 26. We need a privileged log.

On September 22nd, September 28th, September 29th,
October 26th, October 27th, November 3rd, twice on November 4th,
a third time on November 4th with cosmetic changes. That were
the first changes.

January 30, '06; February 15, '06; February 17, '06; February 22, '06, and we raised it in meet and confers, we raised it in open court, we raised it with opposing counsel. We raised it in brief. We raised it in argument.

Now, I don't know how many times you've got to raise something to have two cases tried, excuse me, four cases tried in state court without the benefit of these documents, one case in

federal court tried twice without the benefit of these documents, four cases set in federal court.

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The significance of an MDL from a plaintiff's point of vantage is that if the MDL PSC does its job right, it will be able to produce a work product that can be used in trials. This has been very frustrating. It's been anguishing. It's certainly not as anguishing as it is for this court.

I can assure this, from a plaintiff's point of view, it's quite remarkable that a federal judge would go through 500,000 documents, which, incidentally, constitute more than five percent of what's been produced.

Merck has no authority for the procedure it now suggests. It covers no new ground. There has been no be change in the law. There is no newly discovered evidence, and, in fact, in two Eastern District cases in 2004, *Hodges* and *Feeham*, found under the same circumstances the privilege were waived.

If Your Honor is required to meet in camera with defense counsel, if they go through the 81 boxes and they start pulling documents you want Your Honor to review, we will never get through this process, and this court and counsel have other work to do.

Your Honor, most respectfully, we believe that the case cited, the McMoRan Freeport [sic] case is directly on point. We ask Your Honor to give it to a valued consideration under the circumstances.

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Justice Brandeis, the U.S. Supreme Court once said that "Sunshine is the best disinfectant." You just can't sweep these things under the rug. You can't hide the pea under the walnut. You can't play Three-card Monte. You can't send paralegals and lawyers out to go through documents willy-nilly and have them justify what they are doing by just marking things indiscriminately as privileged, and consciously failing to produce a privileged log that's meaningful.

You don't need to be reminded, these are seasoned lawyers, 15 times on 15 different occasions, we need a real privileged log. Then, what off puts the entire argument made is the fact that they said, Oh, we've made some harmless errors. We'll go release 220,000 pages of documents.

Well, what were they thinking when they say they made a review and there were harmless errors and they left 500,000 documents in 81 boxes? I know what they were thinking. were thinking delay. This will look like we're in good faith. We'll never get to this issue.

So, Your Honor, most respectfully we ask that Your Honor's orders as to the 81 boxes stand and that we get on with the production of these documents. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. I've told you that the cold courtroom would be heated up. It seems to me it has.

I do understand both sides. Let me ruminate or think out loud just a little bit with you about this whole concept of

the privilege and how it fits in with the rules of evidence.

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I'm not unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. As many of you, I have lived with them in the pit, so to speak, practicing law for over 30 years, doing nothing but litigation, so I am familiar with them. I've also taught courses in rules of evidence at law schools, and I published a couple of books on the area.

It's always been intriguing to me, frankly, the dichotomy or least the tension between the other rules of evidence that exist in the Code of Evidence or even the common law and the rules of privilege. With regard to the rules of evidence, their job and their function is to seek the truth and to elicit the truth and to allow the truth to be told in some unblemished fashion.

Rules 801, 803 and 804, particularly 803 and 804 are the exceptions to the hearsay rule, they prevent hearsay from getting in, but there is a host of exceptions which allow certain aspects of hearsay to come in.

612, 613 are the rules that deal with the use of writings and allow the fleshing out of testimony and the confrontations of witnesses with various previous testimony.

401, 403 ensures the use of material which is not prejudicial but allows it to be used in evidence.

106 allows the full disclosure of writings by each side, by the other side.

All of the rules of evidence seek to allow evidence; to fashion the way that it is acceptable and can be received by the fact finder. The rule of privilege is a little different. The rule of privilege promotes relationships above disclosure.

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The concept of privilege recognizes that there are some relationships in society that are more significant, frankly, than the disclosure of relevant material to the fact finder, but, because it's such a deviant, such a difference from the rest of the rules, there is a high burden placed on the party urging the privilege. It's strictly construed usually, privilege is, and the party urging it has the duty, the burden of showing the privilege.

The attorney-client privilege is really the oldest privilege available. I used to think that perhaps the medical privilege, privilege between patient and doctor, was the oldest, but clearly Hippocrates didn't have that privilege. You see nothing in Herodotus, nothing in Thucydides that discusses that.

The attorney-client privilege really goes back to Roman law. Not as far as the Greeks but to Roman law. The interesting thing to me about it is that it was originally based on the concept of loyalty that a client owed the attorney and the attorney owed the client.

We see it coming into English law in the Elizabethan times, but it is, again, based on this concept of loyalty that existed between the two parties.

In the 18th century, it's still with us, beginning to take fashion and form, and it changes a bit there and begins to be based on what we recognize today as the real reason for the privilege. It's replete in cases today. Three concepts, three propositions bolster that privilege. Hold it up, support it, if you will.

First, the law is complex, and for members of society to comply with the privilege, they need to consult with lawyers; the first leg of that triangle. Second, lawyers can't discharge their duty without full knowledge of the facts; the second aspect of that concept. And third, a client can't be expected to confide in a lawyer without the assurance that the lawyer cannot be forced, cannot be made to testify in court as to what the client told them. Again, it elevates relationship above disclosure, but it's something that is different from the rest of the rules of evidence.

In modern times it has been particularly difficult to apply that privilege to corporations, originally, as I said, comes out of this loyalty concept, concepts that really are people relationships as opposed to attorney relationships to a corporation. And indeed, some of the first cases didn't allow it to apply to corporations, but the Supreme Court weighed in in the '70s and clearly stated that in the *Upjohn* case that it was applied to corporations, 449 U.S. 382.

So it's clearly applicable to corporations, and it's a

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significant privilege.

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I take it very seriously, frankly, because as I say, I've lived and walked in your shoes for three decades, and I know the significance of attorney-client privilege. I know the significance of the relationship between lawyer and client. So I take it very seriously. I take it extremely seriously and even more so when the likes of Phil Wittmann, John Beisner urged the privilege, professional lawyers, capable people, experienced individuals, so it's significant to me that you stand up and say that these are privileged documents.

As I said at the outset, I got the documents. All 81 boxes. They are housed in another courtroom, which I had been visiting frequently, more so than my own courtroom, as I looked at the documents.

I take it seriously, but I also expect that the people who extract the documents and put that very, very significant privilege claim on them to take it seriously. And so I was surprised to find in the documents that were claimed privileged things such as promotional overviews, press releases, studies which are already into evidence in various forms, sales meetings, question and answers regarding various TV interviews, statistical analysis protocol, discussion points for meetings.

I also saw a drawing of a bathrobe for a male and a female with a Vioxx patch on the right sleeve. Somehow or another that was declared a privileged document.

I saw a script for a commercial regarding a man in a dog park without pain, obviously, bending down, tying his shoes, feeding his dog, and there was a remark -- and I assume it may have been a remark by a lawyer, since it's the only reason it would be eligible to be privileged -- the remark was, "I'm concerned about the friskiness of the dog. Should have a peaceful dog." And there are the other things. There is an ad for Southern Living magazine.

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Some of the documents contain handwritten notes, but I don't know who wrote them. I don't know who penned the material. There is nothing in there that helps me. I could barely decipher the handwritten notes. I looked at them and did the best I could to decipher them, but I couldn't make out everything, and what's more, as I've said, I didn't know who wrote them. I didn't know whether it was the janitor, whether it was an employee, whether it was a lawyer, whether it was a corporate executive. I had no road map.

But I trucked on and looked at the documents. I examined the documents, and I excluded those documents that I felt were privileged, allowing the other documents to remain in the box, putting them back in the boxes from whence they came.

I felt it appropriate, rather than waiting until the end, I wanted to get some feedback from the parties, so at the end of, as I said, about 30 boxes, I did a minute entry telling the parties that I had done that and giving the documents that I

still maintained were privileged to the defendants so they could extrapolate from that what documents were nonprivileged and give me some input, and they did.

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And they gave me the names of some attorneys, some of whom I hadn't known to be attorneys before. I hadn't known they were attorneys. I had seen their names in the e-mail, but I saw a lot of other people's names in the e-mail.

In any event, with that information, I continued on with the 81 boxes of documents with that new information, and then I went back and looked again a second time at the first 30 boxes of documents with that additional information.

I felt that the documents that were not privileged, were not privileged because either the privilege was waived, had no adequate privilege log, or that the documents had already been disclosed either during TV presentations or the letters were out in public. I had seen them during the course of the trial, and they were in some form or fashion no longer privileged, if ever they were privileged. In short, I felt the party urging the privilege failed to carry the burden.

So I am going to deny the Motion to Reconsider with the view that I have taken into consideration the material, information and some of the points that the defendants have presented or raised.

What I'm going to do is, by tomorrow, I will have all of the privileged documents back in boxes, in a box or boxes, and

I'll make them available to the defendants. By Monday, noon, I will have the plaintiffs pick up all of the documents unless the defendants takes some action to get them back, but I want to give them an opportunity at least to look at what I've done. And the only way I know is a fair way of doing this is to give the defendant access to it and give you some days to look at it and think about it, but by Monday, at noon, I would appreciate somebody taking all of those boxes and getting that other courtroom unburdened by that material.

MR. HERMAN: Your Honor, we won't have any problem removing those boxes. I do have one housekeeping matter.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. HERMAN: Mr. Wittmann has advised me that the Approve material, he needs the names of the individuals to receive it. I have those. Tom Klein, Chris Tisi, the four lead counsel in the cases that are set for trial in the MDL, myself, Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Don Arbitblit of the Lieff Cabraser firm, Mr. Burt Black, and Mr. John Restaino.

Also, Mr. Wittmann has something, a motion. I need to review it, relating to the Victor study at Oxford. We should be able to get something to you by the end of the week, and we appreciate the opportunity to appear before you.

THE COURT: All right. One other thing I want to logistically run past you two. I received a motion pro se from a person saying that they do not have access to LexisNexis, and

they called LexisNexis, and LexisNexis said if they got an order 1 2 from me they would permit access. I'm not quite sure I 3 understand the full scope of that, but my question to you-all is if you have a problem with that? 4 5 MR. WITTMANN: Is it somebody who is a party to the case 6 Judge, or just an outsider? 7 THE COURT: No, a plaintiff. Pro se plaintiff. 8 sorry --9 MR. HERMAN. Is this a plaintiff that's institutionalized? No? 10 11 THE LAW CLERK: I don't think he institutionalized. 12 think he's pro se, doesn't have an attorney, might not want an 13 attorney, contacted LexisNexis wanting to get access. 14 MR. HERMAN: I don't think I got a copy of that. 15 THE COURT: If you want to communicate with him and find 16 out the full scope of it. 17 MR. HERMAN: 18 THE COURT: And I'll report to Mr. Wittmann and we'll 19 get back to you and you can give me your input. 20 MR. WITTMANN: I encourage those people to communicate 21 with Mr. Herman. 22 THE COURT: Whether or not they are institutionalized. 23 MR. HERMAN: Phil, you've always been of great help to 24 I appreciate it. me.25 MR. WITTMANN: Judge, just so I clear on the order with

respect to the privileged documents, we'll pick up the privileged 1 2 documents tomorrow. We'll have until Monday to decide what to do 3 after we have been able to extrapolate backwards and see what the 4 ruling actually are. 5 THE COURT: Right. And not hearing from you, I'm going 6 to release them Monday. 7 MR. WITTMANN: Fair enough. Thank you, Judge. 8 Thank you. The court will stand in recess. THE COURT: 9 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Everyone rise. 10 MR. HERMAN: Judge, may I approach with Mr. Wittmann. Ι 11 have one other thing that's come up. 12 THE COURT: Yes. 13 (END OF COURT) 14 15 16 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 17 I, Cathy Pepper, Certified Realtime Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Court Reporter, Official Court 18 Reporter, United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and 19 correct transcript, to the best of my ability and understanding, from the record of the proceedings in the above-entitled and 20 numbered matter. 21 22 Cathy Pepper, CCR, RPR, CRR Official Court Reporter 23 United States District Court 24

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