## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN RE: TAXOTERE (DOCETAXEL) 16-MD-2740

PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION \*

Section N

August 7, 2017

> ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

## <u>Appearances:</u>

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Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography using computer-aided transcription software.

1 **PROCEEDINGS** 2 (August 7, 2017) 3 THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. You can take a 4 seat. THE CLERK: This is 16-MD-2740, In Re: Taxotere 5 Products Liability Litigation. 6 7 Counsel, could you please make appearances for 8 the record. MS. MENZIES: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Karen 9 Menzies on behalf of plaintiffs. 10 11 MR. MICELI: David Miceli on behalf of the 12 plaintiffs. 13 MR. LEMMON: Andrew Lemmon on behalf of the plaintiffs. 14 15 MS. BARRIOS: Dawn Barrios on behalf of plaintiffs. MR. LAMBERT: Palmer Lambert also on behalf of 16 17 plaintiffs. 18 MR. WOOL: Zachary Wool on behalf of plaintiffs. 19 MR. RATLIFF: Harley Ratliff on behalf of the Sanofi 20 defendants. MS. BRILLEAUX: Hi, Your Honor. Kelly Brilleaux, 21 22 liaison counsel for Sanofi defendants. 23 **THE COURT:** We have a number of counsel on the phone. 24 Do y'all hear me? 25 What I'm going to do -- because I had Blanca

take roll call of the folks on the phone -- so we don't spend 1 03:42 20 minutes with everyone talking all over each other, I'm going 2 to list everyone that we have on the phone. 3 If I miss you, 4 just speak up. 5 I have Chris Coffin. 6 MR. COFFIN: Yes, Your Honor. 7 **THE COURT:** Kathleen Kelly. 8 MS. KELLY: Yes. Mara Gonzalez. 9 THE COURT: 10 MS. GONZALEZ: Present. 11 THE COURT: Peter Rotolo. 12 MR. ROTOLO: Present. 13 THE COURT: Michael Suffern. Present, Your Honor. 14 MR. SUFFERN: 15 THE COURT: Brandon Cox. 16 MR. COX: Present. 17 THE COURT: Beth Toberman. 18 MS. TOBERMAN: Present. 19 THE COURT: Kyle Bachus. 20 MR. BACHUS: Present. 21 THE COURT: André Mora. 22 MR. MORA: Present. 23 THE COURT: Did I miss anyone? 24 MR. MOORE: Douglas Moore, Your Honor.

Okay.

Douglas Moore.

Gotcha.

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THE COURT:

We are here on plaintiffs' motion to compel responses to requests for production, at least part of it. This matter has to some extent been bifurcated or trifurcated by Judge Engelhardt in terms of what's before me and what's before him. You all are well aware of other issues on French law and the Hague Convention and the service issues that Judge Engelhardt is presiding over. I'm presiding over essentially the scope of the discovery requests that have been propounded.

I don't think that we have had an actual motion hearing yet in this case in my court. So just by way of background, when I have these discovery hearings, having reviewed everything that's been presented by way of the pleadings and any other part of the record that I think is appropriate, I usually come in with some sense of what I want to do in the case and what I think the right result is.

Oftentimes I have questions for counsel, to either or both sides. What I will usually do is rather than have an oral argument in the traditional sense, I usually have questions.

In this case what I'm going to do is ask the defendants if they have anything they want to add to the arguments they have made that aren't in the pleadings because the plaintiffs did file a reply memo. Then I'm going to tell you all what I think about the motion and what I'm inclined to do. Then I will give you all the opportunity to address those

comments once I'm finished with that.

Mr. Ratliff, the first thing I want to ask is:
Do you have anything to add to the submissions? As I said, I know the plaintiffs filed a reply memo. This is sort of an opportunity for you to have the last word, so to speak.

MR. RATLIFF: Thank you, Your Honor. I will try to keep it brief, at least as it relates to some of the issues that they have raised in their reply memo.

One of the things that you will see throughout their reply memo is the, I guess, complaint that the two French defendants -- Sanofi S.A., the holding company, Aventis Pharma S.A., another French company -- and the two U.S. defendants have not responded to the request for production where they mentioned the interrogatories on behalf of what they called the predecessor entities.

Now, the predecessor entities, as defined in their discovery, is essentially all 350 of the subsidiaries in the Sanofi group of companies -- the parent companies, the affiliate companies, the sister companies, former companies, lawyers, officers, directors -- a fairly broad scope. In support of that they say, well, any time a successor company is the, quote, mere continuation of a predecessor company, their liabilities and acts are relevant and can be imputed.

The one part that I feel like that Your Honor needs to understand is there is a clear, logical misstep on

their part which is, one, there is nothing in their complaint that alleges that any of these successor companies are the mere continuation of these undefined predecessor companies. So it's not part of any of the allegations in the complaint.

The other part of this, Your Honor, is that whether a successor company is a, quote, mere continuation of a predecessor company -- same company, new path -- is a legal determination that has to be made by the Court. That's exactly what the case that they cited to -- I think it's the *Patin* case -- says.

So it's not just an assumption. It's not just a given that predecessor entities automatically -- their contacts or their liabilities pass on to the successor entities. That's a separate legal determination, a separate evidentiary legal determination that has to be made. That part of it, I think, is what takes us so far afield from really the issue at hand, which is: Is Sanofi S.A., the global parent corporation in France, the alter ego of these two U.S. defendants?

That is the allegations that are in their complaint, paragraphs, I believe, 17 and 18. They don't allege that the French entities sell or market in the U.S. They allege that they are the alter egos of these two U.S. defendants.

So that is one of my concerns, as I read through the reply brief, that it seems to take what we think is already

expansive discovery and expands it even further out beyond what is sort of the narrow issue at hand.

Your Honor, one of the things that you said to me at the last hearing that kind of stuck with me is you said, "Mr. Ratliff" -- and I'm paraphrasing, Your Honor. You said, "There may be things you don't think they are entitled to, but there's probably some wiggle room." I think that goes both ways, Your Honor.

There may be things they think are interesting, things that in an ideal world they would like to have, but what it really is is: What are the facts that are necessary? That's the term the Fifth Circuit uses. That's the term the Eastern District of Louisiana uses. What are the facts that are necessary to rule upon the limited issue or the discrete issue of personal jurisdiction as put forth by the plaintiffs? So in that case it is are these entities -- Sanofi up here, the foreign company, their two indirect U.S. subsidiaries -- are they one and the same? So that is where I think the crux of this dispute lies.

THE COURT: So the issue you are raising is an issue that I did want to talk to you all about. That's the ultimate question. To answer that question, certain facts are required, the development of certain facts are required, and the plaintiffs are entitled to develop some of those facts. So what I'm wondering is the issue you have raised with the

predecessor companies -- so whether a successor company is a mere continuation is a legal determination, but it has to be made on facts.

MR. RATLIFF: Correct.

THE COURT: And whether the successor corporation is the mere continuation of a predecessor may be relevant in this case if the answer to that question is "yes" and the predecessor company had sufficient relationships here. Then that's relevant to the ultimate determination of whether there's personal jurisdiction over the French defendants in this case.

How is the legal question of whether the successor is the mere continuation of the predecessor answered without any information from the or a predecessor company? That's Part 1 of the question. Part 2 is I think the answer is they are entitled to some information, but how do we reasonably limit the scope of that request?

MR. RATLIFF: I think how you limit the scope of that request -- well, let me step back a little bit. I think to make that determination, the mere continuation determination as I'm going to call it, would literally require the review of every sort of -- how one particular company was acquired, what were the terms and agreements of the merger, did one company take on the liabilities or contacts of another company.

**THE COURT:** Did they ask for that information?

MR. RATLIFF: Of course not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I didn't think so.

MR. RATLIFF: Of course not. It's also not part of their allegations. There is nothing in their master complaint, which Judge Engelhardt gave them three months to put together, that says these predecessor companies had some sort of jurisdictional contacts that would give rise to specific jurisdiction. There is nothing in their master complaint that says these predecessor companies are, guess what, also the alter ego of these two U.S. defendants.

They are bound by the allegations that they put in. Those are the allegations they chose to make. The allegations they made were Sanofi S.A. is the alter ego of these two U.S. defendants. In responding to discovery, I think that's what we were guided by.

THE COURT: There are ways to prove that that go beyond -- I don't know that they are required to allege those specific facts in a complaint. If they are alleging that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the French defendants and they are alleging that the French defendants are the alter ego of the U.S. defendants, they are making those allegations. The specific factual elements to get from Point A to Point B, I don't think they are required to allege every single possibility.

MR. RATLIFF: Maybe not, Your Honor, but I think

there has to be something in the master complaint that speaks to that. So this morning, when I was reviewing the master complaint, the things I looked for were: Is the term mere continuation used anywhere in the master complaint? It's not. Is successor in interest or that these were all one and the same mentioned in the master complaint? No. Is there any allegation that these predecessor entities were also the alter ego of the U.S. defendants? That's nowhere in the complaint. So most of their reply focuses on the successor predecessor entity.

Then I went back and I looked at how they defined that in their discovery, and it literally talks about everybody, all subsidiaries. So I don't even know -- and this is a conversation I had with Mr. Lemmon, who I have had very good discussions -- we have talked a lot about this. I said, "I know you probably don't believe me. I want to help you find what you want, but I can't just go back to my client and say, 'Give me all communications for all of your companies for the last 20 years.'"

THE COURT: Based on the definition in the discovery request.

MR. RATLIFF: Yeah, for the last 20 years. "Give me an idea of what are you looking for and that will help me" -- it's like "Tell us everything about how you allocate profits and losses." I wouldn't even know where to start in talking to

my client about where you go down that road. So I said, "Tell me what are the things that you want to know."

I know one of the complaints is that they are not happy with what they think are generalized interrogatory responses. The discussion I had with Mr. Lemmon after those were served is, I said, "Look them over. This is the best we could do based on how this interrogatory was phrased." He said just describe this process, so we described it in general terms. "If there's additional information that you want to know, tell me what that additional information is so I have something actionable that I can go back to my client and find out how I go about getting it."

To me, it's a practical standpoint on my side, which is I need to be able to send something to my client besides "Give me all your intercompany loans that you have ever made for the last 20 years." They wouldn't even know where to start with that. So that is, I think, sort of the crux of the problem as we talk about how we get to, I guess, a solution to this.

I think the other part is you have to look at what are the factors for making an alter ego determination.

Some of those factors are stock -- they are the *Hargrave* factors.

THE COURT: I'm going to interrupt you because part of the issue that I have with where we are in the briefing is

that you all spent a lot of time in your opposition memorandum trying to relitigate their entitlement to personal jurisdiction discovery in the first instance. That's the impression I got when I read it, and it's clearly the impression that the plaintiffs' lawyers got when they read it because they came right out of the gate in the reply memo. I took it the same way.

In large part we can discuss how to further limit some of the requests and to, I guess, narrow the scope, but I believe, based on what I've been reading, that the plaintiffs' counsel has made a good-faith effort to narrow and tailor their requests to establish what they needed to establish to prove personal jurisdiction under the circumstances in this case. I don't think -- and I'm generalizing. I don't think, generally, that you have provided what I think are responsive responses.

Now, what you are telling me now is that you're having difficulty -- and you have tried to negotiate, I guess, some narrowing with plaintiffs' counsel. You are having difficulty responding fully to some of these requests because you think they are too broad. For instance, a request for production asks for all documents about --

MR. RATLIFF: Your Honor, I will give you an example.

One of them is we submitted a sworn declaration that said these
two French entities have never sold or marketed this product in

the United States. They don't allege otherwise. One of their requests for production is all communications from 1997 to 2011 about marketing and Taxotere with the French defendants. What that would require me to do --

THE COURT: I don't want us to be here all night.

Your response to that request was to refer to the affidavit or the declaration.

MR. RATLIFF: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: This may be overly technical, but that's not an appropriate response. The response is to affirmatively state in an objection or a response that is directed in direct response to that request, whatever the response is, not to direct their attention to another document that is executed broadly to cover many other topics and issues and say your answer to this specific request is covered by this general statement, whether it's under oath or not.

That's not going to work, and it's not going to work for a lot of reasons, one of which the plaintiffs pointed out in their original motion and reply. It's not responsive to the specific request. You have to read between the lines on that declaration to get to the answer that they are looking for. Whether it's an interrogatory response or a response to a request for production, they are entitled to responsive information in the pleading that is directed at that specific request or interrogatory.

MR. RATLIFF: I understand that, Your Honor. I think, again, a little bit of the difficulty that we have had is when I have met and conferred with plaintiffs' counsel and I said, "I need you to narrow this request," and the general answer is -- I would respectfully disagree about who has been doing most of the giving on this. The general request I have had is "Okay. No, we are not going to do that. We are not going to narrow these."

THE COURT: I'm not taking a position on who has been doing most of the giving or any giving. All I have ever said was it's my impression that you all have a productive adversarial relationship and that you have made a lot of progress without Court intervention. I'm not judging whether they have not given, whether you have not given, because I don't know. I'm not in those meet-and-confers. I have had cases in the past where I have ordered the parties to hire a court reporter at every meet-and-confer they have because they always disagree about what happens. I'm not going to do that here --

MR. RATLIFF: I don't think we want to do that.

THE COURT: -- because that's not what's going on.

All I can glean is what I can glean from the pleadings. I

don't know what you all talk about in the meet-and-confer. I

do know that there was an indication in your opposition

memorandum that you were going to meet further and you were

going to try to resolve what you could. I heard nothing beyond that from either side, whether all of these things are still in dispute; and, if so, why haven't we been able to make any progress. I don't know what happens in those meetings.

MR. RATLIFF: Understood, Your Honor. So we did meet and confer for probably an hour and a half the Friday before last -- me, Mr. Lemmon, and two of his colleagues -- on all of these. We made it through, I think, two or two and a half of the requests for production before we essentially ran out of time. Ultimately it was decided that they would just file their reply. We would get a chance to look at it.

We have not had time to have a substantive meet-and-confer about the individual requests for production, their responses that they have outlined in their reply. That just hasn't happened, and some of it is a by-product of time, Your Honor. They're traveling, I'm traveling, and now it's Monday and we had to be back here before Your Honor on that.

So one of the things I was going to tell them and I will say now is there are a number of these requests for production, now that I have seen their replies, where I think they could be answered in a more fulfilling way by giving them a detailed interrogatory response, now that I know what they are looking for, that explains the foreign exchange risk management system -- how it's used, how often it's used, when it's used, why it's used -- versus just telling them what it

is, as opposed to me having to go through 20 years worth of documents that maybe -- transactions that literally happen every single day for 20 years.

So there's the burden part and the sort of just practical standpoint of what I can give them versus what would be almost impossible to give them.

THE COURT: Why doesn't somebody from the plaintiffs' side kind of advise me where things are.

Here's my concern. I could order the defendants to do all kinds of things and respond without objection. You all have two issues: (1) Time; and (2) You want to get to the bottom of whatever it is that you want to get to the bottom of, and you want responses and information that make sense and that are not thousands or tens of thousands of pages of documents that counsel has been able to go, with a targeted request, to go obtain what it is that you need.

I can say, "Give them everything they ask for," and it sounds to me like you're not going to like what you get. I can understand if that's the result because either you or they are going to be casting too broad a net. And that's not going to address the first problem, which is time.

MR. LEMMON: Right.

THE COURT: It's going to take more time, perhaps, to do it that way than less.

MR. LEMMON: That may well be right. I would like to

start kind of where Mr. Ratliff left off, which is an offer to prepare a fulsome interrogatory response to address the questions that we ask. That will not satisfy us.

We would like to see -- we need to see the documents to be able to traverse whatever it is that they say. What we have seen so far, which they have represented as being fulsome responses, is very general, as you identified in your preliminary remarks.

THE COURT: I will tell you all again I think they are general responses. I really am not saying this to be critical. I think that they are dancing on the head of a pin, and in some cases they are answering questions that weren't asked. I'm hoping that we can get beyond that because, as I have already stated, I think that, with some exceptions, the interrogatories and requests for production are narrowly tailored enough.

I have already stated I have some issues with all documents related to -- we may have some other issues in terms of the breadth of the request that I will speak to. Generally speaking, I think that the information that the plaintiffs are seeking, that is apparent to me in these discovery requests, is information they are entitled to.

I am only interested in ensuring that counsel for the defendants understands exactly what it is that you all are looking for and can get it. So I'm agreeing with you that

these are not full responses. I do not believe that they are full and complete responses. In some cases I think they are too general, and in some cases I think that they are rewriting your request. I'm going to tell y'all that up front. I agree with that proposition.

What I'm trying to figure out is -- I mean, obviously you all are trying to resolve these issues. There's only so much time I can give you all to do that among yourselves. I'm just concerned that dropping an order that they respond fully and without objection to all of these requests is going to turn into a larger problem than we even have now.

MR. LEMMON: Your Honor, that was fair enough.

That's the reason why in the reply we attached the Exhibit A, which gave sort of our suggestion as to the ways that we could agree to narrow stuff. When we had the meet-and-confers, from the very beginning the issue that you raised, I think, is fair, and Mr. Ratliff raised the same issue. He said, "How can I produce all documents that have to deal with this?" We understand that so from the very beginning acknowledged that and gave suggestions as to how some of it could be narrowed.

It can't be narrowed by just giving us a general description of what it is and not producing documents that show the scope of whatever it is. The cash pooling agreement is the first time that it comes up in Request for Production No. 2.

They give a very general description of what that cash pooling agreement is, but in order to prove what we need to prove --

THE COURT: I don't even know that that was a general description. In some cases it's practically a restatement of what was in the disclosures.

MR. LEMMON: Right.

THE COURT: It's like saying, "Describe the cash pooling system or arrangements," and the response was, "We have one." There's hardly any detail associated with the response, so that's one of the issues that I have with the responses. We know there is one because the defendants disclosed it to any number of governmental entities. It's obvious they are looking for more information.

MR. LEMMON: It's not just the information that we are looking for because, you know, we asked that question in both interrogatories and in the requests for production. We need to see documents that actually show what -- not their description of what this particular agreement is, but documents that we can dig into and make our own determinations of whether or not it's important to prove in the jurisdiction of the Court, and then to be able to know the scope of that, to be able to know who is in control of the cash pooling agreement.

Can Sanofi, the French entity, tell the U.S. entity to put the money up? I don't know the answer to that. I would like to see all of the instances when it has come up.

I would like to see the correspondence back and forth instructing them how it goes.

So we tried. Maybe we could do better or maybe, you know, we could talk about it further, but we tried to put all of that into the Exhibit A. That was after meeting and conferring, after having their side to the story of why they were objecting to it, after going through the case law to figure out exactly what we needed out of the requests. Then we tried to put that in sort of at least categorically so that they can go back to their client and say, "This is what we need," or they can do a search using search terms or however they go and pull the documents.

We started with only 15 requests for production. A lot of them deal with specific issues from their specific filings, and we targeted them from the beginning. We spent a lot of time on the front end drafting the discovery requests in a way that it would be narrow and that it would be meaningful.

THE COURT: I agree with that. I agree with almost everything you have said. I am saying that for everyone's benefit, that I agree with almost everything that's been said.

The boilerplate-type objections that I saw in both the interrogatories and requests for production are just not sufficient. They are not sufficient in any case, and they are certainly not going to be sufficient here.

I understand that you all are fighting a battle

over limited discovery because it only goes to jurisdiction. Frankly, I don't see -- or at least it's not striking me in any obvious way that there's a lot of overlap between what might be merits discovery in this case and what is being propounded right now as jurisdictional discovery. Of course, there's always the potential for some overlap.

I can't imagine what motivation plaintiffs' counsel in this case would have for intentionally conducting discovery outside the scope of what they think they need to prove their case on the jurisdictional side. I don't see any of that reflected in their requests. I think that what they have asked for is reasonable, and I think they are entitled to it.

The thing that concerns me is something like what Mr. Ratliff mentioned right out of the bat, which is -- and it may be an example or it may be the only major issue, and it's an issue that I was going to talk to you about anyway -- an overly broad definition of *predecessor*. That is a real, actual, legitimate objection. It may not have been stated particularly well or in detail in the responses, but it's a problem.

You all are entitled to learn whether, I guess, relevant predecessor companies, the successors of which might be mere continuations, had or have the sort of interactions or relationship with the forum that would support your claim that

04.11

you have jurisdiction over the French defendant. But to throw out the typical definition of all successors, agents, lawyers, whatever, just isn't going to get you to the finish line. That's not a controllable sort of request. There has to be some sort of limitation on the information that you are looking for.

MR. LEMMON: Right. We do understand that. I think it's a lot of who the predecessors were, who the active participants were, were presented during the Science Day or whatever you will, Economics Day, whatever it was called, with Judge Engelhardt.

**THE COURT:** Science Day, is that what it was?

MR. LEMMON: Information Day.

MS. MENZIES: I don't mean to interrupt, Mr. Lemmon.

My only point -- and I apologize. We had talked about this earlier. One of the concerns we have, we appreciate 350 -- many, many entities concerned. In our very first interrogatory on this issue, we asked for better understanding of what are the predecessor entities -- we are also trying to nail it down -- and the responses we got were very vague. If we get more meaningful responses, perhaps we can do that.

THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to look at the exhibit to the reply memo that Mr. Lemmon is talking about?

I guess which is sort of your proposal as to how to limit your own discovery.

MR. LEMMON: So it's really in two places that we are willing to limit it pretty much across the board. There are a couple places where it doesn't make logical sense, and you will come across that. I think it will be obvious. We are willing to limit it to a certain time period in 1997 to 2011. That particular time period is the time when there would have been things going on with the predecessor entities, and much less went on later on.

Now, you will see what I'm talking about with one of the last questions. It's a statement that happened in 2015 regarding the HR system. That's something, obviously, that wouldn't be restricted to 1997 and 2011. Other than that, we are generally willing to restrict it to those time periods.

The other restriction that we suggested is appropriate is the predecessor entities. So it is something that we don't disagree with what you are saying. We understand that we are not looking for a thousand different entities and every lawyer who was ever involved and all that kind of stuff, but there is significant activity that took place by specific French entities: Rhone-Poulenc, for example, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer S.A. There's specific activities that took place that involved specific U.S. predecessors to the entities who were the defendants to this litigation now.

So I think we all know what we are looking for. The discussion hasn't been had between us to specifically

identify exactly which entities it applies to. Frankly, we may not know all of those entities. So that's part of the reason why the interrogatories request for identification of those entities.

Mr. Miceli had something he wanted to add.

THE COURT: Hold on. Mr. Ratliff wants to say something.

MR. RATLIFF: Before I have to respond to three attorneys, I would just like to address a couple of points.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RATLIFF: The first point, which is when you were talking about the cash pooling and we gave what you said was maybe too general of a description of how that cash pooling worked --

THE COURT: That was one of the responses. There's another one. Is there a risk management question?

MR. RATLIFF: A foreign exchange risk management system.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RATLIFF: When we start talking about the timing issue, that's my concern, Your Honor. When I went back to them a month ago and said, "Tell me what you want more," I heard nothing back from them until I got their reply and the Exhibit A to it.

Let me give you an example on the cash pooling.

I went back to my client and said, "Here is the information they want to know. Can I give them a more detailed interrogatory? What could we conceivably be able to produce to them that would illuminate that this is a pretty basic process?"

Every single day the U.S. subsidiaries, if they have a cash surplus, pool those together, send them to another U.S. subsidiary, and then put them in a bank account. Every single day. If one of those U.S. subsidiaries is at a loss, then they get a loan at an interest rate. That happens literally every single day, so you are talking about thousands and thousands and thousands of transactions that go on every single day for what they are saying is for 15 and 20 years.

**THE COURT:** I don't think that's what they are looking for.

MR. RATLIFF: But that's what I don't know,
Your Honor. I can give them a more fulsome description. It is
what it is. We are fine with it. It's the document part of
it.

THE COURT: Here's how we got here, because you didn't give them much of anything. I'm hearing what you just told me for the first time. I don't know if these guys over here are or not. I don't know if you have had that conversation as part of your meet-and-confer. I don't know, but I certainly haven't heard it.

MR. RATLIFF: Right.

THE COURT: I'm going to go out on a limb and say this, based on what you just told me for the first time, so I'm making this up as I go along. I would think that they would like to have as detailed an explanation of that system as you can give them, which would be more detailed than what you just gave me, and what you just gave me is way more detailed than what you gave them the first time.

So, as a starting point, I would think that they are entitled to however that system works. I don't think that they wanted daily transaction documents going back 20 years. On the other hand, all of these entities are operating the way they are operating on the basis of some set of rules, some direction, some policy, some something. They are entitled to that information.

MR. RATLIFF: Right.

THE COURT: That's the information that you should be marshaling and giving to them --

**MR. RATLIFF:** Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- to explain systematically how and why those things happen.

MR. RATLIFF: Absolutely, Your Honor. In our opposition we had our own Exhibit A and we said, "These are the things that we could produce to you that we think would be helpful. We will produce documents that are illustrative, that

explain what this process is," without having to get into the nuts and bolts of "Here is a million pages of transactions that happened over the course of 20 years" and "Here is every single communication where somebody is sending an email to the bank." That part of it I'll tell you right now -- and you may order me to do it.

THE COURT: I'm not going to order you to do it.

MR. RATLIFF: It's going to be difficult to comply
with it.

THE COURT: No, I think I just made it clear. Not only am I not going to order you to do it, I think that they would not be happy if I ordered you to do that because I don't think they want that.

MR. RATLIFF: It would be the same for the foreign exchange risk management system. I will give them a far more detailed response now that I have seen what they are really looking for, what they are interested in, how it's used, how often it's used. I'm happy to do that with something that's sort of -- if there's a standard operating procedure or a policy that said this is how this process works. The process is what it is. My concern is more of a burden of what all do I have to try to find and hunt down in a relatively short amount of time.

THE COURT: Let me go back to the beginning because I think where this is headed is -- I'm going to do what we have

been doing in the past. I'm going to tell you what I think needs to happen. I'm going to give you all a brief opportunity to work through making it happen or agreeing on what that's going to look like, and it's not going to be long. If we have to do this again by phone or in person, then we will. Okay.

Let me go back to the beginning so everyone understands how I am viewing this overall. I said what I said at the beginning of the hearing for a reason. We are not going to relitigate the plaintiffs' entitlement to jurisdictional discovery. I feel it's important to say that because the defendants' opposition memoranda went down that road.

There are even arguments as to scope in which you all rely on cases that concern themselves — the decisions themselves were the ultimate decisions on whether the court had jurisdiction over a particular party, and there were statements in those cases such as a close relationship or intertwined relationship standing alone is not enough. There are statements in those cases as to what is sufficient and what isn't sufficient, but that's not what I'm concerned with.

MR. RATLIFF: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No one can prove their position in this case, irregardless of who has the burden of proof, without the facts that they need.

The defendants and the plaintiffs in those cases -- you cited many of them; the *Jackson* case in the

Fifth Circuit, for instance. The Court can't get to the ultimate question unless the necessary facts are presented to the Court to be able to make the case-by-case determination that has to be made. So what I'm concerned with is the plaintiffs' opportunity, ability, and right to obtain the information they need to make their case.

MR. RATLIFF: Understood. Your Honor, one of the things I had suggested in one of our meet-and-confers -- and it's still an open offer to the plaintiffs -- is there are certain things on here that we will streamline for them by just stipulating that they are true or not true.

So one of their questions asked about operational policies. They want operational policies for labeling or operational policies for marketing, etc., etc. If what they are looking for -- and this is what I would be looking for -- is are there operational policies that are corporationwide, do they cut across all subsidiaries, we will stipulate that, yes, there certainly are operational policies that cut across all of the various subsidiaries and there are some that do not. That seems to be a way to try to cut through some of this and particularly given the timing mechanism.

THE COURT: Maybe that is a way. I'm seeing legitimate requests in terms of subject matter. I understand the issue when we talk about predecessor companies and we talk about the pooling arrangement and the daily transactions.

Again, I understand the objection and the concern, even though it wasn't stated particularly clearly in the responses. If this was a garden-variety two-party case, we might be talking about waiver of objections and all of that, but it's not. I'm not going down that road because it's only going to make matters worse, frankly, which is why I'm saying I'm not ordering you to produce a bunch of stuff that nobody wants or needs or is going to help anyone, including the Court.

What I do want is for you all to sit down one more time and go through these requests with an eye toward plaintiffs' counsel actually informing defense counsel exactly what it is you need. It may be broader than you think they are entitled to, but I doubt it, because I'm telling you --

Well, I don't think they are entitled to 20 years of daily transactions on something that happens on a daily basis. I think that the information that they have asked for generally, in their discovery requests, they are entitled to. I'm only concerned with how you are going to marshal the information that they need. That's the conversation I want you all to have.

So I'm already telling you you owe them a bunch of information, and I want you all to take one more stab at figuring out how you are going to give it to them and what it is that you are going to give them.

MR. RATLIFF: I understand, Your Honor. My concern

is marshaling that information too. So I guess the only request I have -- and certainly from the plaintiffs' side -- is that we not go back to a meet-and-confer and then they just dig in their heels and say, "Look, you lost that hearing. We are going to get everything we want. Produce all of it," and then I'm back in front of you. That's my concern. I think that's probably what will happen.

I want to make sure that when we do meet again -- and I can meet on Wednesday. I get back late tonight. I need to talk to my client tomorrow -- that there is at least some understanding of "Give me what you really need or what you really want."

THE COURT: Does somebody want to respond to that?

MR. MICELI: Let me take a couple of stabs at it

first. Your Honor, David Miceli. I'm a member of the PEC. I

want to talk about a couple of issues that have been raised

during the discussions with you today.

I think one way that we can identify who we are looking for documents from and who might be relevant is how the defendants hold themselves out to the public in the history, including the argument today from Mr. Ratliff about what might be relevant. I'm going to take some of this in reverse order.

Mr. Ratliff said, "In order for us to respond on these predecessor companies, we would have to go back 20 years." Well, clearly Sanofi has not been the registered

market holder of this drug for 20 years. There's been a predecessor company, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer. There are public documents that demonstrate that Rhone-Poulenc Rorer S.A. had a U.S. representative, not a company. There was a U.S. representative, Rhone-Poulenc Pharmaceuticals U.S. That's the way it was held out to the FDA. Who is the patent holder? This French company. Who submitted the NDA? The NDA was submitted through their U.S. representative.

So that predecessor interest -- I think

Your Honor might have alluded to it earlier. There may be
companies that are predecessor companies that held themselves
out differently than Sanofi holds themselves out today, and I
think that might be just one case.

THE COURT: If we just started with predecessor companies and got rid of all of the other folderol in the definition of *predecessor* that brings in a world of other people and entities, that would be a good place to start.

MR. MICELI: I would agree with Your Honor, but the web that is created is not created by the plaintiffs' counsel. The web that is created is by the French entity and the various entities they maintain here in the U.S.

We have to have the opportunity, I think, to have a fair and thorough sifting through that information and the facts, as Your Honor has pointed out, of how that works. I think that's what we are really asking for.

Secondly, how does Sanofi hold itself out today, something as simple as going to their website and seeing where they take credit for all of the innovations of this worldwide, global medical scientific company, and it starts out, at least in 1996, with inventing Taxotere. That's not Sanofi's invention. That's their predecessor's invention, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer.

So there are items of fact that we have looked at to try to come up with our requests that take us back farther than 1996, that take us back to the innovators of the product here in the U.S. and in France. So there are facts and there are pieces of evidence that are out there that are required that came to the U.S. in order to get this product on the market here. We have included all that in our submissions.

Those are two of the things, how they hold themselves out, how they have held themselves out, what they take credit for --

**THE COURT:** It shouldn't be difficult to identify those entities.

MR. MICELI: It shouldn't.

THE COURT: So now that you have them identified, now what happens?

MR. MICELI: Well, we have to find out what their involvement was. Some may fall by the wayside, but certainly there are those that will remain. And we know that because

those are the people that dealt with the Food and Drug Administration here in the U.S., the French individuals that are from those companies, both Sanofi and from Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, its predecessor, where they interacted on this product with the FDA. That's why we have that out there.

THE COURT: Mr. Ratliff, I'll say like I did with Mr. Lemmon when he was arguing. I agree with everything he just said in terms of what they are entitled to learn. I agree with that. Now, the only question I'm having is: How do we gather that information, and how do we make sure that the net is wide enough, but not too wide, to capture what it is that I'm saying they are entitled to?

MR. RATLIFF: Sure, Your Honor. I assume that whatever website Mr. Miceli has gone to will be one of the exhibits in the opposition and it will be all in there.

THE COURT: But that's not evidence.

MR. RATLIFF: Right.

THE COURT: They can't traverse a website. They are entitled to gather the information that they have identified that's out there. What I'm trying to do is say: You all are all smart. You know this business better than I do. I am telling you what I think they are entitled to, and I am trying to reasonably limit it so that they don't gather too much, they get what they need, and we do it without an excess of waste of time. I'm talking about the next step in the process.

MR. RATLIFF: Right.

THE COURT: That's the kind of information that I'm saying to everyone they are entitled to.

MR. RATLIFF: I guess my concern, Your Honor, is what does any of what Mr. Miceli just said -- which is not set forth in any of their requests for production in the way Mr. Miceli said. What does any of that have to do with whether one entity, Sanofi S.A., is the alter ego of these two U.S. entities?

So I agree they are probably going to be entitled to that in terms of merits discovery -- who these people are, what they do, who invented the product -- but we are talking about a more narrow issue of --

THE COURT: So when does evidence as to alter ego stop? How far back can you go? You can only go back to when your client's company came into existence?

MR. RATLIFF: I would need to go back farther, but I wasn't looking at that because that's not what these requests were asking for. Again, from my perspective, Your Honor, it becomes the same issue we have talked about, which is the practical --

THE COURT: It's not just about requests for production. It's about interrogatory responses.

**MR. RATLIFF:** Right.

THE COURT: The information that I think I was just

provided by Mr. Miceli did not come from you. It didn't come in an interrogatory response. That's part of the problem. We are not just here on requests for production. We are here on interrogatory responses that are insufficient.

They don't even have a starting point of actual real information that was provided in discovery, in a response, to be able to refine their document requests. That's the way I see it.

MR. RATLIFF: Okay.

THE COURT: Everything I'm hearing right now I'm hearing for the first time. I ought to be able to read it in an interrogatory response somewhere.

MR. RATLIFF: I guess, Your Honor, I'm also hearing it for the first time from them in terms of what they want because that's not what their interrogatories or requests for production are asking. That's what I've been guided by, and that's what I've been guided by in my discussions with Mr. Lemmon. So I feel a little bit from -- what Mr. Miceli said is what I'm hearing for the first time.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me say two things. First of all, are you saying that they have never asked for that sort of predecessor company information in discovery? They have not asked for that information in some form or fashion in discovery?

MR. RATLIFF: In their merits discovery, in the

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**MR.** 

merits discovery that they just served. In terms of their actual interrogatories, I believe it's: Who are your subsidiaries in the U.S.? Where are they located? How were they formed? That's the information they have asked in terms of the corporate structure. We actually give them a very detailed response about that. We say for the U.S. defendants -- I mean, what does it matter what all the other subsidiaries -- where they are formed, what they do?

THE COURT: Well, predecessor companies of either the U.S. defendants or the French defendants could be relevant to the alter ego theory. There are certainly conceivable arguments to be made there.

I haven't memorized all of these interrogatories and requests for production, so I don't know if that information was specifically requested or if it was assumed in a request or a request for production. I don't know the answer to that.

I'm trying to make it as clear as I possibly can what I think they are entitled to. I'm trying to set you all on a very short path to have that open communication, with the benefit of what I'm saying today, to get responses that are meaningful. That's what I want you all to do.

MR. RATLIFF: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Miceli.

MR. MICELI: If I can just add a few things. From

the beginning of this case -- Mr. Bachus, who is on the telephone, filed the first case back towards the end of 2015, and he alleged allegations against Sanofi and its predecessor, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer. That has been a continuous issue on identifying who the defendants are.

We know that Sanofi wasn't around in '96 when this was submitted on an NDA or it was approved on an NDA. We know there were a series of companies. That's why we have these documents. We used the documents that were in our possession to fashion the requests that we did. We didn't spell out for Mr. Ratliff what our theory of recovery is in a memo that says, "Please, this is why we are asking."

THE COURT: Okay. I have already heard Mr. Lemmon say --

MR. MICELI: Right.

THE COURT: -- he has already offered to limit the scope going back temporally to 1997.

MR. LEMMON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Mission accomplished.

MR. MICELI: Okay.

THE COURT: Notwithstanding the one issue that you have raised, the 2015 -- I usually have a pretty good memory, but I can't remember what the specific issue is.

Notwithstanding that, that's already on the table.

MR. MICELI: Understood. With regard to going

forward, we have been involved in this MDL since October of last year, and we have had many, many discussions with the defendants. We want to move forward with discovery as quickly as possible, on all meaningful discovery -- on the jurisdictional discovery, on the merits discovery that does not involve right now the French, until that issue is resolved -- but there are many fronts we are moving forward on and desire to move forward on. In the responses that were offered by the defendants, it says there's some things they will do, but there's no time limit for when they are going to start producing things. That's an issue for us.

THE COURT: That's going to be soon.

MR. MICELI: Okay. There's an issue of the Court wants us to have a meet-and-confer so that we can come and bring these things to a head. We are going to be back before Your Honor next Friday. We would like a deadline that we can inform Your Honor -- before we leave the courtroom today, we can talk and set deadlines to have that, because we want to have hard deadlines so we can ultimately have a hard deadline for our documents.

THE COURT: I'm going to give it to y'all right now. This is how I want to proceed. You all are going to be back here on August 18.

MR. MICELI: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I gave this some thought before we

started, and I wasn't sure if I wanted to go this route. Once y'all started talking, I immediately decided this was the most prudent thing to do.

Y'all are going to be here on August 18. We are going to resolve this finally by that day. The reason that I think that it's acceptable to put off the final resolution until August 18 is because at this point, regardless what I order, nothing is actually going to happen until Judge Engelhardt decides whether there's this entirely different obstacle to conducting this discovery.

So anything I was going to do today was going to be subject to how he rules on the other issues. He hasn't done that. I suspect that he will do that or at least he will have some sort of telephonic hearing or something with you all before the 18th. But because it hasn't happened yet, I don't think that it causes a problem timewise for me to have you all try to at least limit what's left in this dispute. So that's how I want to handle it.

I want you all to take what I have said and sit down and try to resolve as much of this as you can. The interrogatory responses need to be more robust and detailed. I don't want references in any of the responses "See the response to Interrogatory No. 1" or so-and-so's declaration. This is a big enough case -- it involves enough parties and enough lawyers and two judges -- everyone needs to take the time to do

everything technically correct and match responses to the specific requests that are requesting that information so that no one has to read between the lines.

If information is being withheld on the basis of an objection, that needs to be stated. That wasn't clear to me in the responses. That's clearly the rule now under Rule 34. It's less clear whether you have to do that with regard to interrogatories, but I expect you all to do that on both sides. If you are objecting and then responding to an interrogatory, you need to make an indication that you are withholding information, if indeed you are, subject to that objection.

As I said, I think that the information that the plaintiffs are looking for is grist for the mill. I think they are entitled to it. There are some scope issues in terms of overbreadth that we have already discussed that I want you all to try to address between yourselves.

For the most part, I think the plaintiffs are entitled to conduct the discovery that they are attempting to conduct. I have no qualms currently that this is merits-based discovery. None. My only concern is potential overbreadth, and that's what I want you all to talk about.

When I say "potential overbreadth," I mean things like going back 50 years. I mean things like definitions of terms that are overbroad. I mean things that are going to make it overly burdensome for the defendants to

try to marshal a response. That's what I mean by overbreadth.

Hopefully you all can come back on the 18th -- I'm not Pollyanna. I'm not going to necessarily predict we won't have any issues left, but I'm hopeful that you all can take this conversation and make good use of it and come to some agreements and accommodations as to what's going to be produced by way of information and documents.

If not, we will hash it out some more and I will issue an order. Timewise, I'm going to give you all a short leash. For the record, I'm referring to the defendants. I'm going to give you all a short leash to respond, but the clock won't start ticking until and unless Judge Engelhardt says you have to respond, because there is the potential that he is going to say you don't get to conduct any discovery at all and we are talking about the scope of discovery that won't be conducted.

In any event, if he does rule that it's going to go forward, then whatever time period I give the defendants to respond is going to go from then, but it's going to be short, because I've not been given any indication or any permission or anything else to suggest to anyone that any of these deadlines are going to move. We are a little bit more than a month away from the deadline.

I want you all to try to get this solved. If you can't, you can't. That's fine. You're making a record.

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You have already made a record. We will make whatever additional record is necessary on the 18th. If you all want to give me an update by way of letter -- joint letter, separate letters -- to let me know before we get to the 18th what's left to be decided, I would appreciate it, and we can have a more, I guess, enlightened discussion if I know where things stand.

I've lost my train of thought. There was one other thing I was going to say.

Go ahead, Mr. Ratliff. Everybody wants to say something.

MR. MICELI: I wasn't concluded myself yet, and I think there are some things I may want to say that Mr. Ratliff is going to want to respond to.

**THE COURT:** Okay. What's left?

MR. MICELI: Well, you made the statement that everything that you can do for us is going to be put on hold until Judge Engelhardt rules on the jurisdictional rights of the parties.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MICELI: There are some things, however, that we see that we wanted to address to the Court and perhaps just give you a preview for what we would like to discuss with you again on the 18th.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MICELI: One thing that was brought up in some

letters -- and you probably understand we talk and we correspond regularly -- is the discovery plan. You will recall when we were here 10 days ago, I believe Mr. Oot said that some of their deadlines are triggered by the entry of a discovery plan. We have provided them with our draft. We are waiting for their redlines, and then we want to have a meet-and-confer. We need to get that entered because --

THE COURT: That's what we are talking about on the 18th.

MR. MICELI: That's what we are talking about on the 18th. We want to make sure that that is what we are talking about on the 18th.

THE COURT: Just to be clear, when I'm talking about ruling subject to Judge Engelhardt's order, I'm talking about jurisdictional discovery on the French defendants --

MR. MICELI: Right.

THE COURT: -- that the French defendants have said they are not subject to for reasons that have nothing to do with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

MR. MICELI: I understand. We understand that, I should say, but we want to make sure we are before Your Honor on the 18th with a clear understanding that we will be ready to address the entry of a discovery plan on or shortly after that date that will begin triggering the timeline.

THE COURT: That's my expectation.

MR. MICELI: Okay.

THE COURT: That's the discussion we had the last time you all were here.

MR. MICELI: That's Issue No. 1. Issue No. 2 -- and it's my final issue, so I will sit down in a moment.

THE COURT: It usually works the other way. There's usually 15 lawyers on the defense team and two lawyers on the plaintiffs' team.

MR. MICELI: I understand, Your Honor. The other thing is we were here last 10 days ago, I believe, and we talked about this informal discovery. In the meantime, we have sent a letter to defendants. They have responded to us concerning 26(a) issues. That's an issue that I came prepared to talk with you today, but it doesn't sound like the Court is — that may be something the Court wants to discuss on the 18th.

**THE COURT:** Well, I'm not prepared to discuss it today.

MR. MICELI: Exactly. Okay. There are obligations that go beyond a discovery plan, and Rule 26(a) disclosures are just such a thing. The rule clearly says --

THE COURT: We are going to talk about that on the 18th.

MR. MICELI: We'll talk about that on the 18th. Thank you, Your Honor.

**THE COURT:** Let Mr. Ratliff say something.

MR. MICELI: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. LEMMON: I'm sorry. I didn't hear you.

MR. RATLIFF: Your Honor, I am not going to try and belabor this anymore because it's getting late, and I feel like you have made it abundantly clear what your position is. The one sort of practical standpoint that I wanted you to think of is you said, "I don't care whether their jurisdictional discovery is merits discovery or jurisdictional discovery." I guess the one part from just a --

THE COURT: Wait. Are you saying you don't care or you think I said I don't care?

(Phone rings.)

THE COURT: Boy, don't let that happen in Judge Engelhardt's courtroom.

MR. RATLIFF: I understand your position. You
said --

THE COURT: I don't think that this is mixed. If there is some overlap, it's not hitting me in the face.

MR. RATLIFF: Okay. The one issue I see is on some of these, these documents are going to be rolled out in merits discovery, but they are going to be voluminous documents that don't really have a bearing on jurisdiction.

So, for example, one of them is "Produce all your communications with a regulatory agency in the

United States regarding Taxatere." They are certainly going to get that from the U.S. defendants. We are working on that now. In fact, I would like to get those out sooner rather than later so they don't come back here every time and complain about it. I don't want to be in that position.

**THE COURT:** Okay.

MR. RATLIFF: That really has no bearing on jurisdictional discovery and so there's my concern. If I can get some of that out, I will, but when there's that overlap -- I mention it only because the timeline for jurisdictional discovery is this (indicating). The timeline for the merits discovery is going to be a little bit broader. So I guess that's where I would ask ultimately you and at least the plaintiffs, when I talk to them, for a little bit of leeway when they think about what do they really need for the jurisdictional discovery.

THE COURT: What was the specific request you just used in the example?

MR. RATLIFF: "Produce all your communications with a regulatory agency in the United States regarding Taxotere."

THE COURT: Let me just say that to say that that request can't seek information that's germane to the jurisdictional argument from the French defendants, I do not agree with that.

MR. RATLIFF: That I understand Your Honor, but as it

relates to all the communications the U.S. defendant had with that regulatory agency --

**THE COURT:** We are talking about the requests that are directed to the French defendants.

MR. RATLIFF: There lies the rub. They have sent this discovery to all four of the defendants, so now I have to figure out who I respond and who they are asking the documents from.

THE COURT: Hold on. This motion to compel is a motion to compel responses from the French defendants. That's the issue in front of the Court today. They have not moved to compel responses from the U.S. defendants. That's not an issue I'm concerned with. That's not to say they can't conduct jurisdictional discovery against the U.S. defendants to try to close the loop --

MR. RATLIFF: I understand, yes.

THE COURT: -- but that's not been briefed. Nobody has complained about it. There was a statement that the U.S. defendants haven't responded as they agreed to do in a status conference with Judge Engelhardt, but that's the limit of what I have seen in terms of a complaint about the U.S. defendants' responses.

MR. RATLIFF: So, for example, on the regulatory communications from the French defendants, there are going to be no documents, and I will tell them there are no documents.

But as it relates to the U.S. defendants, that's probably going to be 2 million pages of documents.

THE COURT: Well, that's a legitimate concern, but then again I'm asking you all to talk about the responses of the French defendants to this discovery. That's what we are talking about.

MR. LEMMON: Your Honor, there is -- well, it's complete overlap because it's the same questions asked to all four entities.

THE COURT: Right. It's identical.

MR. LEMMON: Judge Engelhardt made clear in the July 12, or whatever it was, call that they were required to answer those requests on behalf of all of the entities, including the U.S. entities. The only reason why it's not before you on a specific motion to compel is that we didn't get those answers until last week. Now, we have gotten those answers now. They are basically identical to the answers we got from the French entities. So I think it is fair that it would be included across the board.

THE COURT: The discussion I want you all to have should include that topic.

Now, having said that, Mr. Ratliff raises a perfectly legitimate concern.

MR. LEMMON: No doubt. I understand that. That certainly will be part of the conversation. To the extent that

I think you have identified, Your Honor, specific things that might be pertinent to jurisdictional discovery, we can limit it to that for present purposes, although we still want those documents at some point. We can work together on that --

THE COURT: What we are working toward is a production and a set of responses that allow the plaintiffs to support -- I know you don't want them to, but this is discovery -- to support their motion by September 18, which means we can't fool around with a bunch of stuff that's merits discovery. You shouldn't have an interest in that right now anyway. Because if Judge Engelhardt says September 18 is the deadline and the deadline is September 18 and y'all are fooling around with merits discovery, you are the ones who are going to pay the price ultimately.

MR. LEMMON: We understand that. I wanted also to bring up sort of another issue because now we are here on interrogatories and requests for production. That's what we are talking about. The requests for production were pretty fully briefed. The interrogatories, we really didn't, and I think from the plaintiffs' side sort of expected that more to be covered on the 18th.

So what I would suggest and ask is that the interrogatories -- not just the 22, or whatever number it was, that they answered, but all of the interrogatories be part of the discussion that we have between now and the 18th. And to

whatever extent we are unable to come to a resolution on it, we would bring it before the Court at that time.

THE COURT: For me to resolve it on the 18th, I need to know what the specific concerns with every interrogatory are. I certainly read the first 22. In fact, I read them all. What I want you all focused on is what you need by way of jurisdictional discovery.

MR. LEMMON: Yes. We understand that.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to get you all to the finish line on September 18 so that the schedule is not upset. If we can't get there, we can't get there. I just don't want to be here every week arguing about what you all have produced. I think, after sitting here now for an hour or so, you all have a pretty good idea. The defendants may think I'm allowing the plaintiffs to cast too wide a net, and I don't think that I am.

I think, as I said, generally speaking, the information they are requesting is potentially relevant to or germane to the arguments they are making. Regardless of whether they pleaded every single element of fact that they needed to to get to the finish line, I think they are positioned to ask those questions and to get those answers, and Judge Engelhardt has said they can do it. The Fifth Circuit, in the Jackson case that you cited to me, it's implicit in the result of that case that this is the kind of information that is grist for the mill in jurisdictional discovery.

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MR. RATLIFF: Your Honor, I think one thing that would be helpful -- and certainly we will talk about this, and I have asked the plaintiffs this before -- is as we go through the interrogatories or we go through the requests for production, if they could let me know who they are directing that request for production to. Like I said, they identified all four of the defendants, but in my mind some of them seem clearly targeted to one defendant --

THE COURT: That's quite possible. If that's the case, that's part of what you all should be talking about.

MR. RATLIFF: That would be helpful.

The response I have received is "Well, how do we

I said, "Well, just give me your proof."

**THE COURT:** The message I'm trying to send is the

Help me help you is sort of the mantra I'm trying to get to because I don't want to be back here arguing My client certainly wants to get this resolved, the

jurisdictional issue is going to get resolved. It's going to get resolved according to the law, and it's going to get resolved with Judge Engelhardt having every single relevant fact that either party can put before him to make the

determination he needs to make in this case on these defendants. That's going to happen. I want everyone to

understand that.

MR. MICELI: We understand that, Your Honor. I think that part of what Mr. Ratliff just raised is -- I don't want to say a hollow argument, but much of this is going to be determined by a simple timeline. Sanofi didn't exist as the market holder for the -- for the registered market holder, so that's not an issue. Who answers the question is going to be a calendar-driven item.

THE COURT: You guys keep arguing about a meet-and-confer that you haven't had yet.

MR. MICELI: Right.

THE COURT: You get to come back here on August 18, hopefully, and tell me that you've got it resolved, which won't happen. I have given everybody their marching orders. We don't need to keep beating it to death.

MR. MICELI: I understand, Your Honor. Just so we are clear, we want the Court to know when we come, we are going to sit down in good faith and go through these topics with them. We don't have the crystal ball that tells us what the documents are. So when we say to Mr. Ratliff we don't know because we haven't seen, what we are not asking for is Mr. Ratliff's considered and researched summary of what Sanofi and Rhone-Poulenc Rorer did.

We want to judge what the documents tell us and what the documents that were filed here in the U.S. -- and

perhaps there's some in France that tell us about what these companies did. Because I can assure you I have never stood up in front of a jury and said, "The defendants have explained this to me. This is what they say, and this is why you should find for our clients." It is the documents that will tell the story in this case, it's the documents that will prove their liability, and it's the documents that we want to see.

**THE COURT:** We are not talking about proving liability. We are talking about jurisdiction.

MR. MICELI: Correct.

THE COURT: We are also talking about a situation where no documents have been produced yet and we have a September 18 deadline.

MR. MICELI: No documents have been produced by any defendant in this case other than some labels. Lots of documents have been produced and obtained so far from the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: I'm just telling y'all when we get here on August 18 and I start ordering things to be produced or responded to, it's not going to be 30 days. It's going to be on a much shorter timeline. It has to be.

MR. MICELI: Thank you, Your Honor.

**MS. MENZIES:** Thank you, Your Honor. Just a couple maybe somewhat housekeeping items.

So it sounds like just foreshadowing for the

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18th -- and if you recall, we are a little bit concerned about the amount of things that will be covered that day. I just want to make sure we get our submissions to you in time for you reviewing all of it.

We had talked before about the general discovery plan. We would submit, to the extent we can't agree, we will make our submissions three days before, which would be the 15th. If we have issues on this front -- so what we may be faced with in court are, I guess, both the jurisdictional interrogatories and the requests for production -- should we make submissions to you on that same day? Do you want those sooner?

THE COURT: I don't need them sooner than that.

MS. MENZIES: Okay. So we will have that one also on the 15th.

THE COURT: What I don't want -- and I'm not picking on anybody. I don't want: "We have to give the judge a submission by this date, so we are going to stop talking because we have to give him something three days before." If it takes another day, take another day.

MS. MENZIES: I appreciate that.

THE COURT: I want y'all to work as close to the hearing as you can. I am familiar with this part of the dispute, so I just need to know what's left. If it's everything, it's everything, and we will deal with it, but I

need to know what's left. As to what's left, I would like to know what you have talked about and why you can't resolve it and what the sticking point is so that we can be focused when we get together on the 18th.

MS. MENZIES: Okay. One issue, since we are still focused on the timeframe of the jurisdictional discovery -- and we appreciate that. We served last week, I guess a week ago from today, the 30(b)(6) notice related to the jurisdictional issue. We have not received a response on that.

I raise it only because I'm concerned that before they have told us they would not be producing anybody. So I don't know if we need to have an accelerated time to sort that out. We noticed it for August 22. I'm not sure what their position will be.

THE COURT: I doubt that the defendants' position is that they are not going to produce a 30(b)(6) witness.

MR. RATLIFF: Your Honor, no. We received their 30(b)(6). I looked at all of the topics. I was waiting, frankly, to have this hearing before I fired off some sort of missive to the other side about what I would or would not do.

The other part, on sort of my standpoint, is finding the witness or multiple witnesses, which I'm trying to avoid because, as phrased, I may have to find five, six, seven witnesses to address these. I'm hoping that's not the case. I would like that to be part of our meet-and-confer, in terms of

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how do we narrow some of those, so that I can get one witness or two witnesses on this 30(b)(6) and then give them dates.

I can tell you August 22, Karen, is not going to work, but I assume given --

MR. MICELI: We are good the 23rd.

MS. BARRIOS: Or the 21st.

THE COURT: I'm going to encourage you all to discuss as much of this as you can. We don't need formal motions to resolve everything, as you all know. When y'all come on the 18th, we can talk about all these things. We can talk about what issues y'all are having in terms of the areas of examination of the 30(b)(6). We can do that on the 18th as well. If you all have those conversations before then, all the better.

**MR. RATLIFF:** Okay.

THE COURT: I know that the 18th is, in large part, about the discovery plan, but I want the time that you all spend on discovery between now and then to be primarily aimed at trying to solve the jurisdictional discovery problems. It's easy for me to come in here and say to the defendants you're going to do this, this, and that. I'm trying to avoid creating more problems by doing that than would be created if we talk about what the real problems are and try to solve them that way.

We are going to get to a point where I'm just

going to have to order you all to produce things and respond to interrogatories. That's what I'm going to have to do because I'm as beholding to the schedule as you all are.

MR. RATLIFF: We will do everything to avoid that happening.

**THE COURT:** See you all next week. Thanks. (Proceedings adjourned.)

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## **CERTIFICATE**

I, Toni Doyle Tusa, CCR, FCRR, Official Court
Reporter for the United States District Court, Eastern District
of Louisiana, certify that the foregoing is a true and correct
transcript, to the best of my ability and understanding, from
the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

<u>s/ Toni Doyle Tusa</u> Toni Doyle Tusa, CCR, FCRR Official Court Reporter